Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected? by White, Heather M.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 9
1988
Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?
Heather M. White
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. Rich. L. Rev. 285 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol22/iss2/9
UNBORN CHILD: CAN YOU BE PROTECTED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuing medical advancement in the area of prenatal care' raises
the question of when, if ever, the state may intervene in the life of a
pregnant woman to protect her unborn child from abuse and neglect.
This issue, though troublesome, can no longer be ignored. Since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,' giving the pregnant woman the
constitutional right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,'
there has been abundant controversy over the allowance of state interven-
tion to protect the human fetus.4 This controversy necessarily entails a
discussion as to when and in what manner 5 the state may legally infringe
upon a woman's constitutional rights.'
This Comment argues that the unborn is a "person" entitled to legal
protection. This Comment then considers the interests of the state and
its power to intervene on behalf of the fetus. It will further explore the
constitutional rights of the pregnant woman. A discussion of the state's
ability to impose medical treatment upon women will follow, with a focus
on the necessary distinction made in allowing intervention only in life-
threatening situations. The Comment will then address whether a finding
that a child is abused may be predicated solely upon the prenatal miscon-
duct of the mother. Finally, this Comment will examine the court's bal-
ancing of the state's interests and the rights of the fetus with the consti-
tutional rights of the pregnant woman in its determination of whether
state intervention is permissible.
1. See Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Is-
sues, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 696 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Id. at 154. This right is not absolute. At the point of viability, the state may assert
important interests sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the pregnant woman's
decision.
4. The status of the fetus has been dealt with in great depth by a number of commenta-
tors. See generally Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Consti-
tutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); King,
The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 1647 (1979).
5. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1051, 1052-53 (1981); see also Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 217, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1977) (mother's prenatal heroin use was not felonious child endangering
within meaning of statute so court could not remove twins born addicted to heroin). But cf.
In re Baby X, 9 Mich. App. 111, 116, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (newborn's symptoms of
narcotics withdrawal sufficient evidence of mother's prenatal neglect to take temporary cus-
tody of baby).
6. See Note, supra note 5 at 1064-67.
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II. THE UNBORN CHILD AS A "PERSON" ENTITLED TO LEGAL PROTECTION
A. Historical Development
Laws relating to the unborn child have undergone tremendous change.
Until recently, the courts have been reluctant to afford the unborn child
any legal rights, except in relatively limited areas.' The fetus was viewed
as a part of the mother." It was not until after birth that the child gained
any legal rights as a distinct entity.' Today, most American jurisdictions
7. See generally Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (1984).
In the law of property and inheritance the unborn child was recognized as a person. The
unborn child could inherit if he was conceived before the death of the decedent, and was
later born alive. Id. at 4-6.
The unborn child was not initially recognized in early tort law but was later permitted
recovery for prenatal injuries if born alive. Id. at 6-9.
The common law also recognized as a crime the killing of a fetus. Today, abortions are
legal except when the fetus has attained viability. In criminal law, however, most states have
retained the rule, adopted by the Model Penal Code, that the definition of homicide is the
"killing of another human being" and "human being" is defined as "a person who has been
born alive." Thus the fetus is not warranted protection under the criminal law, unless the
state, like California, incorporates the term "fetus" into its homicide statute. Id. at 11-13;
see also Parness, The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential Life,
20 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1986).
8. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes denied recovery when the pregnant woman's fall resulted in a miscarriage of her
four to five month old fetus, who died moments after birth. He stated that "as the unborn
child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not too
remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by [the mother]"; see also Morrison, Torts
Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 131, 131-41 (1979).
9. Today, a cause of action for prenatal injuries is allowed in almost every jurisdiction. In
most states, recovery is permitted only if the fetus is viable or quick at the time of the
injury. Other states permit a cause of action to be maintained by a child, subsequently born
alive, for prenatal injuries sustained from the time of conception. Still others recognize
wrongful death recovery for the death of a viable fetus (and some states even allow an ac-
tion maintained by the pre-viable fetus) if the fetus would have been able to maintain an
action for personal injuries if it had lived. Five states have not dealt with the issue (Alaska,
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine and Wyoming), and five states do not recognize recovery either for
prenatal injuries or wrongful death of a fetus (Arizona, Arkansas, Montana, Nebraska and
Virginia). For a complete and fairly recent listing of each state and the corresponding cita-
tion for the decision of the court, see Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Wo-
man's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
325, 331-32 (1984).
Virginia, when presented with this issue, refused to allow a wrongful death action for a
stillborn child because of the view that an unborn child is part of the mother until birth.
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 142, 169 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1969). Again in Septem-
ber, 1986, the Supreme Court of Virginia allowed recovery only to the mother for injuries
and mental anguish suffered by her as the result of the fetal death occurring while the
infant was part of her, stating that the lower court had correctly instructed the jury that
"injury to an unborn child in the womb of the mother is to be considered as physical injury
to the mother." Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 67, 348 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1986); see also
Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 184, 343 S.E.2d 301, 305 (1986). Although Virginia has only
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allow tort claims for prenatal injuries if the child is subsequently born
alive.1" This satisfies the basic purposes of tort law to compensate the
innocent victim and deter harmful acts.1 In accordance with these pur-
poses, courts allow an infant to recover against third parties for injuries
suffered as a result of tortious conduct inflicted on the pregnant woman.
2
In this area, the courts have recognized that a fetus has legal rights. 3
B. The Effect of Roe v. Wade on the Rights of the Fetus
In the context of the abortion issue, the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade' 4 stated that the fetus is not considered a "person" entitled to four-
teenth amendment protection. 5 This statement must be given narrow ap-
plication. It does not necessarily imply that the state may not grant legal
recognition to the unborn in non-fourteenth amendment cases.' 6 The
Court, in fact, has noted that the state has an "important and legitimate
interest in potential life.' 7 Roe also defines when the state's interest be-
confronted the issue of whether or not the fetus has a cause of action for wrongful death,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has determined that
the Virginia Supreme Court would allow actions for prenatal injuries. Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F.
Supp. 1371 (W.D. Va. 1975). In Bolen, an action was brought by the father against physi-
cians and the hospital for damage allegedly resulting when his infant sons were born with
defects following the performance of a tubal ligation on the mother without determining
that she was pregnant prior to the operation. The court pointed out that "there are funda-
mental policy distinctions between a wrongful death action such as that in Craven and the
case at bar." Id. at 1373. The federal court reasoned that there were compelling objectives in
favor of allowing actions for prenatal injuries; foremost was the belief that "fundamental
notions of justice dictate" compensation be made to children who "must endure life with
physical and mental handicaps which proximately resulted from the negligence of others."
Id. Thus, if the reasoning of Bolen is to be accepted, it would seem Virginia would allow an
action to be brought by an infant who had sustained prenatal injuries. ("This court simply
cannot believe that Virginia would opt to be a minority of one among the numerous states
considering this issue."). Id.
10. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, AND D. OWEN; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 55 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. Several.jurisdictions have abandoned the
requirement that the child be born alive. See O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo.
1983) (en bane) ("[t]he timing of the tortious conduct does not affect either the extent of
the child's injuries or the desirability of the defendant's conduct").
11. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 4.
12. Johnsen, supra note 4, at 601-02.
13. Id.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. Id. at 158.
16. Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of
Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 257, 258 (1982) ("The failure to understand the Roe decision has led
not only to courts mistakenly denying the unborn non-fourteenth amendment protections to
which the unborn are entitled, but also to the public failing to comprehend the discretion
remaining to American lawmakers in characterizing personhood.").
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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comes compelling"8 and authorizes the state to regulate the abortion deci-
sion at that point.' 9
If the state is bestowed with the power to govern a pregnant woman's
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy when the fetus is at the
stage of viability, then it would seem logical to further confer on the state
the power to protect the unborn from abuse and neglect.20 Since the un-
born is entitled to legal protection against the tortious conduct of third
persons,21 this protection should be extended to safeguard the unborn
from abuse and neglect from the pregnant woman without overstepping
the parameters of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade." Al-
though the unborn child has been granted only limited legal personhood
in the past,2 the recent trend is toward greater acknowledgement. 4 Pro-
tection from prenatal abuse and neglect, therefore, is consonant with the
current developments in the law and with sound public policy.' 5
III. STATE INTEREST v. RIGHTS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN
A. State Interest
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade'6 legitimized the state's
interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn as well as the health
of the pregnant woman." At the point of viability, the Court authorized
the state to "go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.'2 This
authorization allows the state to make the act of aborting a viable fetus in
the third trimester a criminal offense. 29 Thus, it should ensue that the
Court would allow the state to intervene when other acts which would
lead to the same result were being committed by the mother." This
would include omissions, because a failure to act could lead to similar
results."'
Since the state can require the pregnant woman to complete the term
of her pregnancy after the fetus becomes viable, it follows that the state
18. Id.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Myers, supra note 7, at 16.
21. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
22. Myers, supra note 7, at 16.
23. Id. at 16 n.57.
24. See supra note 9.
25. Myers, supra note 7, at 16 n.57; see also King, supra note 4, at 1659-64.
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. at 163-64.
29. Id. at 164-65.
30. See infra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
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would have as great an interest in protecting the quality of life that it has
saved. In order to do so, the court should be entrusted with limited au-
thority to proscribe any acts which would result in injury or disfigure-
ment to the child.32 The states have argued that such authority to protect
the unborn derives from the doctrine of parens patriae3' and the state's
police power. In Prince v. Massachusetts,34 the Supreme Court extended
the parens patriae authority to limit a parent's freedom in matters affect-
ing a child's welfare. 5 In decisions since Prince, courts have given the
states abundant authority through both the parens patriae and the police
power s to protect children from abuse and neglect.3 7 This authority
would then attach to secure the health and safety of the fetus. In fact,
certain courts have interpreted state abuse and neglect statutes as provid-
ing for the fetus .3
32. Myers, supra note 7, at 19.
33. Parens patriae has been defined as the "inherent power and authority of a Legislature
of a state to provide protection of the person and property of persons no sui juris." McIn-
tosh v. Dill, 87 Okla. 1, 12, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922).
34. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
35. Id. at 166-67. In addition, the parens patriae doctrine imposes a positive duty to pro-
tect the child, according to In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("The
rationale of parens patriae is that the state must intervene in order to protect an individual
who is not able to make decisions in his own best interest.").
36. See Myers, supra note 7, at 24 and nn.102, 103.
37. Id. at 26-31.
38. See Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 521, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (1961) ("nothing
in any of [the statutory] provisions . . . would preclude their applicability to an unborn
child"); see also In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 115-16, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980)
(prenatal conduct causing post partum injury could constitute child abuse within the mean-
ing of the juvenile code); In re Baby Boy Santos, 71 Misc. 2d 789, -, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820
(Fain. Ct. N.Y. 1972) ("The court is sitting as parens patriae in a matter such as this.").
Professor Myers, in his extensive article entitled Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can
the State Intervene?, has suggested that state interests in the unborn support statutory
construction to extend coverage to the unborn child. He argues that this would be the only
way to give meaningful effect to the important state interests in "preservation of life, the
potentiality of life, and child welfare." Myers, supra note 7, at 29. He writes:
An interest stripped of a method of enforcement is a feckless thing. Nowhere in the
law are significant state interests unaccompanied by a means of implementation. This
is certainly true where the state seeks to prevent death or serious bodily injury. The
only reasonable mechanism to implement state interests is through existing abuse
and neglect statutes. Since these statutes can be construed to include the unborn,
protection of legitimate state interests calls for such an interpretation. The law
should follow the course charted in Bertinato. Doing so will nourish important state
interests, and extend long overdue legal protection to the unborn.
Id.
Myer further argues that recent scientific advances in prenatal medicine and fetal surgery
create a demand for care which will grow. There will still be parents who refuse to consent
to care but these objections can be ignored by the courts if child abuse and neglect statutes
are interpreted to include the unborn. Id. at 30-31. Myer concludes "[iun an age when
medicine can treat and cure the unborn child, society will not tolerate a complete vacuum of
authority to provide care in compelling cases." Id. at 31.
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B. Constitutional Rights of the Pregnant Woman
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to endow Ameri-
can citizens with a variety of rights. 9 The pregnant woman is no excep-
tion. Commentators" and courts4' have argued that the pregnant woman
is entitled to such constitutional rights as the right to bodily integrity, the
right to make intimate family decisions, the right of privacy, and the
right to liberty and freedom from bodily restraint.
The right to bodily integrity was firmly established as early as 1891 in
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford.42 It gives every individual the right to
"possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference," except by "clear and unquestionable authority of law."'4 3 The
constitutional right to bodily integrity empowers a woman to refuse medi-
cal treatment,44 even when such refusal would result in death.45 This
right, however, is a qualified one. Not all interference is prohibited.
Courts have allowed state interference where there has been a legitimate
state interest and no less intrusive means would accomplish the state's
goal.4 6 The state in these instances, however, must provide procedural
safeguards. 47 Hence, a state may intervene only if the intrusion is neces-
sary to realize a state objective that is of greater consequence than the
woman's right to bodily integrity.48
The New York Supreme Court in Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v.
Paddock49 permitted state intervention over the mother's objections by
authorizing the hospital to administer necessary blood transfusions to the
mother and child during surgical procedures. The court conceded it would
not have forced a blood transfusion on a woman who was not pregnant
over her religious objections.5" The court justified the ordering of the
39. See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
40. See Note, supra note 5, at 1053-64; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 614-25.
41. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
43. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
44. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
45. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see also
Comment, The Right of Privacy and the Terminally Ill Patient: Establishing the "Right-
to-Die," 31 MERCER L. REV. 603 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144.
47. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-48; see also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1979).
48. See generally Note, Lifesaving Medical Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus: Limita-
tions on State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 970-74 (1986).
49. 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985); see also In re Jamaica Hosp., 128
Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
50. Crouse, 127 Misc. 2d at -, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445. In cases involving the ordering of
blood transfusions and surgical procedures, the courts have denied the pregnant woman her
[Vol. 22:285
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blood transfusion under its parens patriae power, because the state's in-
terest in protecting the health and welfare of the unborn child required
the parent's interest to yield to the state's interest. 1
The right to autonomy in intimate decision-making was pronounced in
Griswold v. Connecticut.5 2 The Supreme Court determined that a mar-
ried couple had a constitutional right to decide to use contraceptives."
This right later extended to non-married couples.54 The Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade,55 relied heavily upon the woman's right to autonomy in
intimate decision making to prevent state interference in the pregnant
woman's abortion decision before the third trimester. 6 In state actions
which merely affect but do not prohibit a woman's abortion or child-bear-
ing decision, the Court has permitted state interference. 57 The right to
autonomy in intimate decision making is not absolute. As in cases involv-
ing bodily integrity, the state may limit the right to autonomy provided
the state has a compelling reason to do so and its limitation does not
result in an outright denial of the right.5"
right to freedom of religion. Most courts have ignored the issue or merely brushed over it.
See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (no mention of right to religious belief although
mother was a Jehovah's Witness and objected to blood transfusions on religious grounds);
Crouse, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443. One court, in its concurring opinion, noted that
courts have "drawn a distinction between the free exercise of religious belief which is consti-
tutionally protected against any infringement and religious practices that are inimical or
detrimental to public health or welfare." Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth.,
247 Ga. 86, -, 274 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1981) (Smith, J., concurring); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981).
In Jefferson, 247 Ga. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 461, Justice Smith further wrote that the power
of the state was not absolute and, therefore, the state was required to find the least restric-
tive means of burdening the freedom of religion. There was, however, "no less burdensome
alternative for preserving the life of a fully developed fetus than requiring its mother to
undergo surgery against her religious convictions." Id. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 461.
51. Crouse, 127 Misc. 2d at -, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. Id. at 485-86; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protect-
ing the right of an extended family to live together); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(applying principles articulated in Griswold to invalidate an obscenity statute).
54. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Id. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973).
58. For a discussion of parental rights in situations of state intervention to protect the
unborn child, see Myers, supra note 7, at 53-54, 59; Note, supra note 5, at 1061-64 (develop-
ment of the right of parents to make child-rearing decisions).
Myers also has an excellent section on the rights of the father, in which he points out that
"[a]t a minimum, [the father] is entitled to the constitutionally protected right of a parent
to freedom from unwarranted government intrusion." Myers, supra note 7, at 61.
Myers writes further than when there is a controversylbetween the mother and father, the
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The right to privacy, described as the "right to be left alone,"5 9 has
long been held as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 0 It is certainly a valuable right to a pregnant
woman, who relies upon it to secure her body from physical intrusion by
the state. The courts have recognized this right by declaring unconstitu-
tional, intrusive state regulation of the pregnant woman." If the state can
prove it has a compelling reason for such intrusion, the state may en-
croach upon a woman's privacy. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court
in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority6 ' authorized
the hospital to perform a caesarean section upon the mother who was in
her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy.6 ' The court held:
[T]he State has an interest in the life of this unborn, living human being.
The Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jef-
ferson and her husband John W. Jefferson, is outweighed by the duty of the
State to protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death
before being given the opportunity to live.
64
Hence, even the sacrosanct right of privacy, that is held more "sacred"
and is "more carefully guarded" than any other right, 5 can be interfered
with when an interest such as protecting an unborn child is established
by the state.
The fourteenth amendment further protects the fundamental right to
liberty. 6 Freedom from unwarranted bodily restraint flows from this
right, as pronounced in Youngberg v. Romeo. 7 Any state action to protect
woman's greater rights will usually predominate for it is she who will physically bear the
child and thus is more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy. Id; see also
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1976).
59. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding
unconstitutional various provisions of an abortion statute, including: 1) a mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting period before performance of any abortion; 2) a requirement that
post first trimester abortions be performed in a hospital; 3) an "informed consent" provi-
sion; and 4) a requirement concerning the disposal of remains of abortions); Planned
Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 67-71, 75-79 (holding unconstitutional statutory requirement of
spousal consent for abortions and statutory prohibitions of saline amniocentesis as a method
of abortion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973) (striking down as "unduly restric-
tive" statutory requirements that all abortions be performed in accredited hospitals, be ap-
proved by a committee of at least three members of the hospital's staff and two physicians
in addition to woman's physician, and be restricted to state residents).
62. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
63. Id. at -' 274 S.E.2d at 458.
64. Id. at -' 274 S.E.2d at 460.
65. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 230, 251 (1891).
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... ").
67. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (due process requires freedom from unreasonable bodily re-
straints); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the unborn child would constrict a pregnant woman's freedom, depriving
her of her fundamental right to liberty."'
As the above discussion illustrates, the pregnant woman's constitu-
tional rights are not absolute. The state may intervene if it proves it has a
compelling interests9 and the interference is by the least intrusive means
available. The next section discusses situations when the state's interest
is not sufficiently compelling to warrant interference.
IV. FETAL MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES
State authorities may legally intervene when parents refuse to consent
to necessary medical treatment for their children if such interventions
will circumvent serious injury or death."0 Parents have a duty to provide
68. See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 619-20.
Similarly, in order to enforce fetal rights or state regulations dictating behavior dur-
ing pregnancy, the state would necessarily intrude in the most private areas of a wo-
man's life. The state would have to police what a woman ate and drank, the types of
physical activity in which she engaged, with whom and how often she had sexual
intercourse, and where she worked-to name only a few areas of regulation. The en-
forcement of direct state regulation of pregnant women's actions, as in cases involving
court-ordered medical treatment against the pregnant woman's wishes, would require
the state forcibly to take the pregnant woman into physical custody in order to im-
pose the ordered action.
Id. at 619.
Johnsen develops a thought-provoking argument that granting the fetus rights would in-
fringe on a woman's equal protection clause guarantee under the fourteenth amendment by
"serv[ing] to disadvantage women as women by further stigmatizing and penalizing them on
the basis of the very characteristic that historically has been used to perpetuate a system of
sex inequality." Id. at 620. She develops the argument more fully, see id. at 620-25, and
concludes:
Granting rights to fetuses in a manner that conflicts with women's autonomy rein-
forces the tradition of disadvantaging women on the basis of their reproductive capa-
bility. By subjecting women's decisions and actions during pregnancy to judicial re-
view, the state simultaneously questions women's abilities and seizes women's rights
to make decisions essential to their very personhood. . . . Fetal rights could be used
to restrict pregnant women's autonomy in both their personal and professional lives,
in decisions ranging from nutrition to employment, in ways far surpassing any regula-
tion of the actions of competent adult men. The state would thus define women in
terms of their childbearing capacity, valuing the reproductive difference between
women and men in such a way as to render it impossible for women to participate as
full members of society. In light of the great threat to women's right to equality posed
by legal recognition of the fetus, the state should bear the burden of ensuring that
any law granting fetal rights does not disadvantage women or in any way infringe on
the autonomy of pregnant women.
Id. at 624-25.
69. The state almost always asserts an interest in protecting potential life. See supra
notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
70. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be free to be-
come martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves.").
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for the maintenance of their children. 7' Both the courts72 and legisla-
tures73 have mandated that the term "maintenance" includes medical
care; a failure to provide essential medical care constitutes parental neg-
lect.74 There is, however, a limit on what can be required of the parents.
The courts distinguish between two types of parental objection to medical
treatment for children-necessary treatment needed to save the life of
the child and treatment which is not intended to save the child's life but
to improve the quality of that life. The former treatment involves situa-
tions where the state may intervene to order the necessary treatment over
the parent's objection; 75 the latter involves situations in which the ability
of the state to intervene is conditional.
In situations where medical treatment is not necessary for survival, the
courts have reached varying results, depending on the unique facts of
each case. 76 The courts do offer some basis for the varied decisions. As the
71. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447.
72. See In re Appeal in Cochise County, 133 Ariz. 157, 160, 650 P.2d 459, 462 (1982) (en
banc); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
73. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. APP. § 827.05 (West Supp.
1987); Virginia does not specifically include "medical care" in its abuse and neglect statute
but rather states:
A. "Abused or neglected child" shall mean any child less than eighteen years of age:
2. Whose parents or other person responsible for his care neglects or refuses to pro-
vide care necessary for his health; provided, however, that no child who in good faith
is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the
tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination shall for that
reason alone be considered to be an abused or neglected child.
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., People in the Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (par-
ents supported teenager's decision to decline medicine for serious seizure disorder based on
religious grounds but court ordered therapy, concluding that the state's parens patriae inter-
est in guarding the well-being of the boy prevailed over his religious objection); Custody of a
Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (state was allowed to intervene when parents
refused to administer only type of medical treatment which would save child's life); Muh-
lenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super 498, -, 320 A.2d 518, 521 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974) ("The courts have been and will continue to be the guardian of the religious rights of
the individuals to see that this power of the State is not exercised beyond the area where
treatment is necessary for the sustaining of life or the prevention of grievous bodily
injury.").
76. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (court split four to three
against ordering surgical repair of fourteen-year-old boy's cleft palate and harelip); In re
Green, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973) (since fifteen year old boy's life was not in danger,
although he could become bedridden due to collapse of his spine, court did not require
surgery over mother's and boy's religious objections). But see In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900,
278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (court declared fifteen-year-old boy neglected in
order to allow lengthy and dangerous cosmetic surgery to be performed on his deformed
face); Application of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, -, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(court held that infant girl born with spinal disorder should be given a reasonable opportu-
nity to live, grow, and surmount her handicaps).
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degree of risk inherent in the medical treatment increases, the greater the
deference will be to the parent's decision. Likewise, the less likely the
treatment will be successful, the more likely the court will deny interven-
tion. The most important consideration is the degree of harm the child
will suffer if the medical care is forbidden. The greater the harm, the
more likely the court will intervene to allow the medical treatment."
The well-developed body of law on medical care over parental objection
gives the courts substantial guidance when they must determine whether
to allow state intervention over the pregnant woman's objection." There
are, of course, other considerations which must be included in the analy-
sis of prenatal medical care controversies." Several recent cases are
instructive.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,"0 the Su-
preme Court of Georgia denied the parent's motion for a stay of the Su-
perior Court's order authorizing that a caesarean section be performed in
the event the mother presented herself for delivery of her child.81 The
examining physician had found that the afterbirth was between the baby
and the birth canal and that it would have been virtually impossible for
the condition to correct itself prior to delivery.s2 The doctor advised the
mother that there was a ninety-nine percent certainty that the child
would not be able to survive natural childbirth and only a fifty percent
possibility that she would survive vaginal delivery. 3 If a caesarean section
were performed before the onset of labor, the mother and child would
have an almost one hundred percent chance of survival.8 4 The mother
refused such delivery and necessary blood transfusion on religious
grounds.8 5 The court granted temporary custody of the unborn child to
the Department of Family and Children Services, giving it full authority
to make all decisions including consenting to a surgical delivery.86 The
court rested its decision on the basis that the unborn child was a viable
human being entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of
Georgia. It concluded that the child was without proper parental care and
subsistence necessary for its physical life and health.8 7
Although the Georgia Court did not cite as authority any of the cases
involving parental objection to medical treatment, it is apparent that a
77. Myers, supra note 7, at 49-50.
78. Id. at 51-52.
79. See supra Section II.
80. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
81. Id. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
82. Id. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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similar analysis, as described previously,8 was used. In Jefferson, the
harm to the child was considerable-the child had only a one percent
chance of surviving a natural birth. The likelihood of success was also
extremely high-almost one hundred percent. Thus, there is a logical ba-
sis for allowing such extreme intervention, even though the court neglects
to explain its rationale.s9
The New York courts have also been presented with this issue. In
Crouse-Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock0 and In re Jamaica Hospi-
tal,91 the New York Supreme Court permitted the necessary blood trans-
fusions. In Crouse-Irving, the court stated that the state's interest, as
parens patriae, in protecting the health and welfare of the child must
take precedence over the parent's decision to decline necessary treatment
based on constitutional grounds.92 The court did recognize that it may
not "determine the most effective treatment when the parents have cho-
sen among reasonable alternatives." 93 However, the court established its
authority to "not permit a parent to deny all treatment for a condition
which threatens [the child's] life." 94 In In re Jamaica Hospital, the court
indicated that the life of the unborn child must be considered,95 although
it recognized that the patient "has an important and protected interest in
the exercise of her religious beliefs."9 8 Using its parens patriae power, the
court held that it was under an obligation to protect the fetus.91 The New
York court regarded the fetus as a human being even though the fetus
was not yet viable.98 After conceding that in the context of abortion, the
state does not have a compelling interest to protect potential human life
until the fetus reaches viability,9 9 the court declined to offer any rationale
for its decision and stated that "[i]n this case, the state has a highly sig-
nificant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which out-
weighs the patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
89. Bross, Court Ordered Intervention on Behalf of Unborn Children, 7 CHILDREN'S LE-
GAL RTS. J. 11 (1986).
90. 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (mother would allow a caesarean
section delivery but refused the necessary blood transfusions for religious reasons).
91. 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (mother eighteen weeks pregnant
and in critical condition refused blood transfusion on religious grounds although necessary
to stabilize her condition and save life of unborn child).
92. 127 Misc. 2d at -, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court further held that the blood transfusions to safeguard the mother's wel-
fare were also permissible. Id. at -, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46.
95. 128 Misc. 2d at -, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
96. Id. The court indicated that if the pregnant woman's life were the only one involved,
it would not interfere. Id.
97. Id. at -' 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
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grounds."'10 0 Once again, the pregnant woman's objections were ignored
because the state's interest in protecting the fetus was greater than the
woman's right to exercise her religious beliefs.
In a similar case, Taft v. Taft, 01 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
reached a different result by permitting the pregnant woman's right to
prevail. Susan Taft appealed an order that she submit to an operation to
hold her pregnancy.' 0 ' The Probate and Family Court judge ordered Mrs.
Taft to submit to the operation because the Commonwealth had an inter-
est that justified the burden on her free exercise of religion. 0 3 The Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts, however, was concerned with Mrs. Taft's
constitutional right to privacy. Since the record did not show circum-
stances compelling enough to justify the state curtailing Mrs. Taft's con-
stitutional rights, 0 4 the court held that "[a]ny interest the State may
have in requiring a competent adult woman to submit to the operation is
not established."'1 5 Thus, when there is not sufficient evidence that medi-
cal treatment is necessary for the sake of the unborn child, the woman's
constitutional rights override the interests of the state.0 6
V. MATERNAL BEHAVIOR AS A FORM OF PRENATAL ABUSE AND NEGLECT
By adopting an analysis similar to that used in deciding prenatal medi-
cal care controversies, the courts can determine when the state may inter-
vene in the life of a pregnant woman who is engaged in activities that
present a substantial risk to the potential life of her unborn child. Drug
addiction or alcohol abuse have been reported to affect the fetus seri-
ously. 07 Even less serious activities such as smoking, social drinking, poor
nutrition and other inadequate prenatal care have been shown to cause
disorders in the fetus and even death. 0 8 In its analysis, the court should
concentrate mainly on the likelihood and severity of the harm to the fetus
100. Id. at -, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
101. 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
102. Id.
103. The court stated that the state had "a fundamental and traditional interest in the
physical and mental health of all parents, their children already born, and their unborn
children." Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
104. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 397. The court stated:
The record is devoid of facts that support the judgment ordering the wife to submit
to an operation against her consent. We have no findings, based on expert testimony,
describing the operative procedure, stating the nature of any risks to the wife and to
the unborn child, or setting forth whether the operation is merely desirable or is be-
lieved to be necessary as a life-saving procedure. We have no showing of the degree of
likelihood that the pregnancy will be carried to term without the operation.
105. Id.
106. For an excellent discussion of Taft and In re Jamaica Hosp., see Note, supra note
48, at 966-70; see also Myers, supra note 7, at 70-71.
107. See generally Beal, supra note 9, at 358-62.
108. Id.
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and weigh that against the degree of intrusion in the life of the pregnant
woman necessary to achieve the purpose of protecting the unborn child.10
Few cases have been decided by the courts in this area. Of those cases
that have dealt with this issue, most have been actions against the mother
for neglect or abuse. For example, in In re "Male" R," the New York
Family Court allowed removal of the newborn when neglect proceedings
were brought against the mother.' Evidence showed that the infant was
born suffering from mild drug withdrawal symptoms, that the mother was
an abuser of barbiturates, and, as a result of the drug abuse, was unable
to care adequately for her child." 2 Thus, under the Family Court Act, the
infant was a "neglected child.""' 3 The court, however, had difficulty using
the mother's prenatal conduct as the sole basis for its decision." 4 Instead,
the court used the finding of "imminent danger of impairment of the
child's physical condition" 115 as the foundation for its holding. In a more
recent New York decision, In re Smith,"8 the Family Court held that the
unborn child could be considered a person under the Family Court Act."17
Similar to In re "Male" R, the court decided that the child, who was born
with the possibility of having fetal alcohol syndrome, was a neglected
child under the theory of imminent danger of impairment."' The court
then addressed the issue, raised but side-stepped in In re "Male" R," 9 of
whether a finding of neglect could be predicated solely upon the basis
that the prenatal drug use caused an actual physical impairment. 20 The
court held that it could.' 2' This decision and a Michigan decision, In re
109. See Myers, supra note 7, at 52-53.
110. 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fain. Ct. 1979).
111. Id. at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
112. Id. at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
113. Id.
114. Id. at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
115. Id. at , 422 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
116. 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
117. Id. at -, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at -, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
121. Id. The court stated:
In at least one reported decision, a court has held that the excessive use of drugs,
prior to birth, would support a finding that a child was a "neglected child" on the
theory that the parent would be unable to provide adequate care subsequent to birth.
In re "Male" R, 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1979). However, the same court
expressed reservation in regard to predicating such a finding solely upon the basis
that the prenatal drug use caused an actual physical impairment. Cf. dictum con-
tained in In re Vanessa "F", 76 Misc. 2d 617, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1974). The only
distinction, of course, is the fact that, after birth, a child is a person who requires care
and supervision, and it may be safely concluded that a mother, who is addicted to
drugs would not possess the mental capabilities of providing that care because of her
continued addiction and use. On the other hand, drug or alcohol abuse, which results
in actual physical impairment at the time of birth, depends solely upon conduct and
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Baby X, 12 2 establish that prenatal mistreatment can be considered proba-
tive of neglect,1 23 giving the state authority to remove the infant from the
mother's custody, at least temporarily.
124
In re Ruiz"25 is the most helpful decision on this issue. In re Ruiz held
that an infant born to a mother addicted to heroin was abused by the
mother within the meaning of a statute prohibiting parents from creating
a substantial risk to the health or safety of their child.12 The court deter-
mined that at the point of viability the state had an interest in the child's
care, protection and development. 27 In a lengthy opinion, the court de-
cided that the unborn was entitled to legal protection. 28 The court then
determined that the unborn child was a person under the child abuse
statute, and as such had the right to begin life with a sound mind and
body. 
29
In Reyes v. Superior Court,"3 0 a decision contrary to the previous ex-
amples, the court held that a statute relating to felony-child endangering
did not refer to an unborn child or fetus. 31 Thus, a pregnant woman who
continued taking heroin during her pregnancy and failed to seek prenatal
care resulting in the birth of twins addicted to heroin, could not be
charged with felony-child endangering. 3 2 The court concluded that if the
legislature had intended to confer legal personhood on the fetus, it would
have expressed that intent in specific and appropriate terms.133 Since
there was no reference to the fetus in the statute, the legislature clearly
consequences, involving an unborn child. Although the proof in the instant proceed-
ing is insufficient to establish that the Respondent's abuse of alcohol, during preg-
nancy, actually caused fetal alcohol syndrome at the time of birth, the Court never-
theless, holds that such proof was sufficient to establish an "imminent danger" of
impairment of physical condition including the possibility of fetal alcohol syndrome,
to the unborn child. For similar reasons, the Court furthermore holds that the failure
to obtain prenatal, medical care except on one occasion, constituted conduct which
created the same "imminent danger", given the Respondent's history of alcohol
abuse.
Id.
122. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1980).
123. Id. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
124. Id. "We pass no judgment upon whether such conduct will suffice to permanently
deprive a mother of custody. Such custody determinations will be resolved at the disposi-
tional phase where prenatal conduct will be considered along with postnatal conduct." Id.
125. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ct. Com. P1. 1986).
126. Id. at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 939.
127. Id. at 34, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
128. Id. at 32, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
129. Id. at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 939.
130. 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
131. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
132. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
133. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
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excluded the unborn child from protection under the statute."" Reyes,
however, can be distinguished from the cases examined previously. Fore-
most is the fact that the statute in Reyes was a criminal statute requiring
a strict interpretation. 13 5 In addition, the decision is ten years old. In light
of the previous discussion of recent case law, it would seem appropriate
for the California court to reach a different result today.
VI. ACHIEVING THE OPTIMAL BALANCE OF INTERESTS
By virtue of the fact that prenatal cases, without exception, involve a
pregnant woman's constitutional rights, a balancing approach must be
used by the courts to determine when the state may intervene.136 On one
side of the scale sits the state's interest in the unborn child;13 7 on the
other side rests the constitutionally protected rights of the pregnant wo-
man-the right to bodily integrity, to make intimate decisions, to privacy
and liberty from bodily restraint. 38 The degree of justification for state
action which the state must establish rises in direct proportion to the
level of intrusion upon the pregnant woman's rights. To justify interven-
tion, the state must show a compelling interest."13 The state must also
demonstrate that its action will be by the least intrusive means availa-
ble. 4" Each prenatal neglect case will entail a balancing of interests by
the judge, since no absolute rule can be established.'' Because the inter-
ests involved will vary from case to case, it is necessary that the court's
decision be tailored to the unique facts of the particular case. 4 2 While
this approach requires the court to devote more time and effort, the inter-
ests involved certainly warrant such attention.
To make the court's task a bit easier, limitations on state intervention
can be established. Roe v. Wade validated the state's interest in potential
human life.' 4s This interest extends to protecting the unborn child from
injury. It would be inconsistent for the law to require a woman to give
134. Id.
135. Id. at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
136. See Developments in the Law, supra note 39, at 1166-87, 1193-97.
137. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the "compelling state interest doctrine" as applied to fetal medi-
cal cases, see Note, supra note 48, at 975-77.
140. See People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1139, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (1984)
(quoting People v. Arvanites, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1052, 95 Cal. Rptr. 493, 500 (1971)) ("If avail-
able alternative means exist which are less violative of a constitutional right and are nar-
rowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purpose contemplated, those alterna-
tives should be used.").
141. See Note, supra note 5, at 1066-67.
142. Id; see Developments in the Law, supra note 39, at 1197.
143. 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
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birth to a child but not protect that same infant from preventable injuries
which may mar it for life.144
After establishing that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the unborn child which extends to protecting the fetus from injury, the
difficult question arises in determining the point in the pregnancy at
which the state may intervene. The strongest argument is that the state
may intervene only after the fetus is viable. 4 Before such time, it is ar-
gued, the state does not have a compelling enough interest to justify in-
trusion into the constitutional rights of the mother. 4 6 The problem with
this position is the "stark reality"'41 7 that prenatal abuse and neglect can
occur from the moment of conception. For this reason the non-viability
argument is persuasive and appealing. 4 " The argument for state interven-
tion before the fetus is viable must be rejected because, according to the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, the state's interest is only com-
pelling enough to justify interference in the pregnant woman's action af-
ter the fetus is viable.1 49 Before viability, the state's interest is
subordinate to the woman's right "to be left alone."' 50
VII. CONCLUSION
Although there are still unresolved issues in this area, recent court deci-
sions offer an improved framework for answering the initial question:
when, if ever, may the state intervene in the life of a pregnant woman to
curtail abuse or neglect of her unborn child. Based on recent decisions
and the trend toward giving the fetus rights, albeit limited with respect to
the constitutional rights of the mother, the answer is that the state is
authorized to intervene in limited situations. There can, however, be no
absolute rule, as the decision rests upon a careful balancing of the state's
interests and the rights of the unborn child with the mother's constitu-
tional rights and interests. If the state can show it has a compelling inter-
144. For an exceptional argument for recognition of limited state authority to prevent
prenatal neglect and abuse, see Meyers, supra note 7, at 64-65.
145. Professor Patricia King extensively argues for protection of the viable fetus. See
King, supra note 4, at 1673-87.
146. See Note, supra note 48, at 980.
147. Myers, supra note 7, at 66.
148. Myers argues:
Since fetal damage can be substantial and permanent when injury occurs prior to
viability, state authority to intervene should exist throughout the period of vulnera-
bility. It makes little sense to force the state to sit powerless while a pregnant woman
inflicts irreparable injury on her fetus simply because the child is a month or a day
shy of viability. Added to this is the fact that tort law has abandoned viability as a
line of demarcation for liability because it is an illogical cut off point. The state's role
in prevention of abusive injury should not be more limited.
Id. at 66-68.
149. 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
150. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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est in the viable fetus, that the intervention is necessary to prevent seri-
ous injury or save the life of the unborn child, and that the intrusion is to
be accomplished by the least invasive means available, then the pregnant
woman's rights to privacy and liberty must yield to the government ac-
tion. In situations where the fetus is not yet viable or the interference is
not imperative to save the life of the unborn child, the mother's constitu-
tional rights will usually prevail.
Heather M. White
